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THE FISCAL POLICY AND THE STABILITY OF THE NOMINAL SECTOR:  
THE ROMANIAN CASE (REVISITED VERSION) 
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Abstract: the fiscal policies in the contemporaneous economic systems heavy influence both 
the real and nominal sectors. These effects could be located at the primary distribution of the 
social resources as will as at level their redistribution one.  
The aims of this paper are: (1) to review the literature of the main conceptual frameworks 
which link the fiscal policy and the dynamic of real sector, especially on the inflation side (2) 
to advance an empirical analyze of these link for the Romanian case and (3) to draw some 
conclusion about desirable framework of the fiscal policy for the current period in the 
perspective of Romanian access to European Union. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Specialized international economic literature identifies two types of theoretical approaches 
regarding the link between inflation and fiscal policy: on one side an approach promoted by 
Sargent and Wallace (1981) known as „The Theory of inflationary fiscal deficit”, on the other 
side an approach formulated by Leeper (1991), Woodford (1995, 1997, 1998) and Sims 
(1994) known as „The Theory of fiscal determination of the level of prices”. 
The theory of the inflationary fiscal deficit tries to explain, on long term, to what extent do 
significant and persistent deficits determine the in the increase of price indexes and which are 
the precise ways to counteract their negative effect. 
The theory of fiscal determination of the level of prices takes in to the effects induced over the 
inflation by the adjustments of fiscal policy and evaluates the measure in which these can be 
quantized using empirical investigations. Moreover, it is considered that the de facto level of 
price should correspond with the one for which the real value of public debt equalizes the 
present value of future budget excess, ensuring in this way an inter-temporal budget balance. 
 
 
2. THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTS 
 
Knowing the monetary nature of the inflation, economic literatures study the relations 
between fiscal and monetary policy, as well as the results on their impact over inflation. We 
remark, as a matter of fact the interaction between the powers of two characteristic 
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authorities: on one side the Govern as a principle promoter of fiscal policy and on the other 
side the Central Bank, as a forum of conceiving and applying monetary policy.  
In such circumstances the Govern can force the Central Bank to accept direct financing of the 
budget deficit or to maintain the refinancing installment at a low level, so that the cost for 
public credit remains low. Thus, according to Barro and Gordon (1983), a high level of 
independence of the Central Bank can induce a high level of price indexes when the bank tries 
to maintain fiscal sustainability in the economy with cost levels as small as possible. 
Cotarelli et al. (1998) sums up the fact that there is a big impact of fiscal deficit over the 
inflation, especially in countries in which money markets aren’t highly developed; suggesting 
limited access of governs on those markets and their propensity to ask for help from the 
Central Bank. 
 
Of course, the „fiscal-monetary” game is not a unique explanation for the effects induced by 
the fiscal policy on the inflation dynamic. More generally, it could be argued against the 
thesis of fiscal policy neutrality if there are fulfilled at least two cumulative conditions: (1) 
inflation is not a „pure” monetary process but rather a „structural-monetary” one as an 
expression of simultaneous disequilibrium in the real and nominal sectors of the economy; (2) 
the fiscal policy is able to influence the structural determinants of the inflationary processes. 
We consider that such argument could be especially taking into account in the case of an 
emergent economy as the Romanian one which is in a phase of deep structural, functional and 
institutional transformations. Thus our analytical objective is to provide some evidences for 
the thesis of fiscal policy non-neutrality in such a case.  
 
The next section describes the empirical analysis framework and the results derived from its 
appliance for the Romanian involved variables in the last 10 years of transition (monthly data 
provided by National Bank of Romania public disclosure in its publications). A brief 
discussion of the results is done in Section 4 and some conclusions are formulated and some 
further research directions are suggested in Section 5. The main output of the proposed 
analysis consists in finding some supportive empirical evidences for a relevant impact of 
fiscal policy over the inflation dynamic in a short time span. 
 
 
3. METHOD AND RESULTS 
 
In order to test the links between the inflation and some budgetary macro-variables (public 
revenues and public expenditures) a Vector Error Correction (VEC) could be involved. The 
VEC methodology presents several advantages. In particular, it allows building a model of 
the connections between some co-integrated variables, being extremely useful in the study of 
the economic fluctuations. 
 A VEC model is a particular restricted Vector Error (VAR) model designed for use with 
non-stationary series that are known to be co-integrated. The VEC has co-integration relations 
built into the specification so that it restricts the long-run behavior of the endogenous 
variables to converge to their co-integrating relationships while allowing for short-run 
adjustment dynamics. The co-integration term is known as the error correction term since the 
deviation from long-run equilibrium is corrected gradually through a series of partial short-
run adjustments. 
 
To take the simplest possible example, consider a two variable system with one co-integrating 
equation and no lagged difference terms. The co-integrating equation is: 
 
( )1
,1,2 tt yy β=  
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The corresponding VEC model is: 
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In this simple model, the only right-hand side variable is the error correction term. In long run 
equilibrium, this term is zero. However, if 1y  and 2y  deviate from the long run equilibrium, 
the error correction term will be nonzero and each variable adjusts to partially restore the 
equilibrium relation. The coefficient iα  measures the speed of adjustment of the i -th 
endogenous variable towards the equilibrium. 
 
The vector of the endogenous variables has the following representation: 
 
[ ]tCHP ttt VPIPY =               (3)  
 
where: IP
 
- variations in the level of inflation, VP - variations in the level of public revenues, 
CHP - variations in the level of public expenditures and t represent the current period t. 
Variations that can be expressed as: 
100
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For presenting how such a model can be applied in approaching the inter-linkages between 
inflation, public revenues and their allocation, in an instable economic system, as in Romania, 
we propose an analysis made for September 1998 - December 2007 period, which was shaped 
by important changes in the fiscal policy. The seasonal effects are drawn from the original 
data by the usage of an X12-ARIMA procedure in order to preserve a more stable interaction 
between the involved variables. 
Despite some differences between them, the group unit root tests suggest that there could be 
identified some common unit root processes which are driving the involved variables but not 
individual unit roots: 
 
Group unit root test: Summary   
Sample: 1998M01 2007M12   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User specified lags at: 6   
Andrews bandwidth selection using Quadratic Spectral kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
     
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  22.6873  1.0000  3  336 
Breitung t-stat -5.35734  0.0000  3  333 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -5.81936  0.0000  3  336 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  44.0105  0.0000  3  336 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  168.018  0.0000  3  336 
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Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Hadri Z-stat  1.43287  0.0759  3  336 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
The estimation of the general model parameters described by the relation (3) leads to 
following results: 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates  
 Sample (adjusted): 1998M09 2007M12 
 Included observations: 112 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
    
    
Cointegration Restrictions:   
      B(1,1)=1   
      B(1,2)=0   
      B(2,1)=0   
      B(2,2)=1   
      A(2,1)=0   
      A(3,1)=0   
      A(1,2)=0   
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 2):  
Chi-square(3)  0.902901   
Probability  0.824728   
    
    
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2  
    
    
IP_SA(-1)  1.000000  0.000000  
    
VP_SA(-1)  0.000000  1.000000  
    
CHP_SA(-1) -0.162919 -1.001500  
  (0.20626)  (0.06640)  
 [-0.78989] [-15.0818]  
    
@TREND(98M01) -0.019409  0.008666  
    
C  1.335811  0.105342  
    
    
Error Correction: D(IP_SA) D(VP_SA) D(CHP_SA) 
    
    
CointEq1 -3.170459  0.000000  0.000000 
  (0.55242)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
 [-5.73921] [ NA] [ NA] 
    
CointEq2  0.000000 -2.902789  0.931589 
  (0.00000)  (0.92919)  (0.80961) 
 [ NA] [-3.12401] [ 1.15067] 
    
D(IP_SA(-1))  1.639269 -0.083658  0.058595 
  (0.51537)  (0.30429)  (0.26733) 
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 [ 3.18077] [-0.27493] [ 0.21919] 
    
D(IP_SA(-2))  1.128469 -0.058543  0.145588 
  (0.45046)  (0.26597)  (0.23366) 
 [ 2.50517] [-0.22012] [ 0.62309] 
    
D(IP_SA(-3))  0.833613 -0.052351  0.146438 
  (0.37165)  (0.21944)  (0.19278) 
 [ 2.24299] [-0.23857] [ 0.75961] 
    
D(IP_SA(-4))  0.478365 -0.016845  0.123813 
  (0.28736)  (0.16967)  (0.14906) 
 [ 1.66470] [-0.09928] [ 0.83065] 
    
D(IP_SA(-5))  0.203813  0.032529  0.087290 
  (0.19488)  (0.11507)  (0.10109) 
 [ 1.04582] [ 0.28270] [ 0.86350] 
    
D(IP_SA(-6))  0.061771  0.040960  0.030700 
  (0.10685)  (0.06309)  (0.05542) 
 [ 0.57810] [ 0.64924] [ 0.55390] 
    
D(VP_SA(-1)) -1.113610  1.124648 -0.841193 
  (1.47290)  (0.86965)  (0.76401) 
 [-0.75606] [ 1.29321] [-1.10103] 
    
D(VP_SA(-2)) -0.582886  0.658657 -0.674071 
  (1.28427)  (0.75828)  (0.66616) 
 [-0.45387] [ 0.86862] [-1.01187] 
    
D(VP_SA(-3)) -0.229841  0.492489 -0.543579 
  (1.06288)  (0.62756)  (0.55132) 
 [-0.21624] [ 0.78477] [-0.98595] 
    
D(VP_SA(-4)) -0.252484  0.314011 -0.467767 
  (0.82870)  (0.48929)  (0.42985) 
 [-0.30468] [ 0.64177] [-1.08820] 
    
D(VP_SA(-5)) -0.487516  0.145086 -0.365241 
  (0.54985)  (0.32465)  (0.28521) 
 [-0.88664] [ 0.44690] [-1.28059] 
    
D(VP_SA(-6)) -0.386456  0.048236 -0.183017 
  (0.26095)  (0.15408)  (0.13536) 
 [-1.48094] [ 0.31307] [-1.35208] 
    
D(CHP_SA(-1))  0.279244 -2.151895 -0.194715 
  (1.51205)  (0.89277)  (0.78432) 
 [ 0.18468] [-2.41036] [-0.24826] 
    
D(CHP_SA(-2)) -0.146577 -1.580109 -0.208820 
  (1.34450)  (0.79384)  (0.69741) 
 [-0.10902] [-1.99046] [-0.29942] 
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D(CHP_SA(-3)) -0.657006 -1.210711 -0.086818 
  (1.13423)  (0.66969)  (0.58834) 
 [-0.57925] [-1.80787] [-0.14757] 
    
D(CHP_SA(-4)) -0.221427 -0.828428  0.049259 
  (0.90895)  (0.53668)  (0.47148) 
 [-0.24361] [-1.54363] [ 0.10448] 
    
D(CHP_SA(-5))  0.174207 -0.457075  0.201463 
  (0.62568)  (0.36942)  (0.32454) 
 [ 0.27843] [-1.23727] [ 0.62076] 
    
D(CHP_SA(-6))  0.222489 -0.137721  0.157973 
  (0.32374)  (0.19115)  (0.16793) 
 [ 0.68724] [-0.72049] [ 0.94071] 
    
C -3.650670  1.044573  0.518463 
  (12.1463)  (7.17161)  (6.30040) 
 [-0.30056] [ 0.14565] [ 0.08229] 
    
@TREND(98M01)  0.047173 -0.002722 -0.018235 
  (0.17038)  (0.10060)  (0.08838) 
 [ 0.27687] [-0.02706] [-0.20633] 
    
    
 R-squared  0.754896  0.703883  0.559828 
 Adj. R-squared  0.697705  0.634789  0.457121 
 Sum sq. resids  300690.8  104825.0  80903.60 
 S.E. equation  57.80146  34.12803  29.98214 
 F-statistic  13.19958  10.18734  5.450729 
 Log likelihood -601.0601 -542.0478 -527.5419 
 Akaike AIC  11.12607  10.07228  9.813249 
 Schwarz SC  11.66006  10.60627  10.34724 
 Mean dependent  0.082002 -0.089756 -0.356119 
 S.D. dependent  105.1292  56.47282  40.69219 
    
    
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  1.42E+09  
 Determinant resid covariance  7.37E+08  
 Log likelihood -1620.619  
 Akaike information criterion  30.22533  
 Schwarz criterion  31.97294  
    
    
 
In order to check the appropriateness of the estimated VAR and the VEC specification 
stability the inverse roots of the characteristic AR polynomial could be analyzed. Such an 
analysis confirms that the estimated VEC could be considered as „stable” since there is only 1 
unit root as is imposed by the VEC specification and therefore in terms of involved 
parameters the stability of the model could be considered as „good enough”: 
 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: IP_SA VP_SA CHP_SA  
Exogenous variables:  
Lag specification: 1 6 
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     Root Modulus 
  
  
 1.000000  1.000000 
-0.672570 + 0.585462i  0.891693 
-0.672570 - 0.585462i  0.891693 
-0.061351 - 0.827350i  0.829621 
-0.061351 + 0.827350i  0.829621 
 0.504295 + 0.635366i  0.811174 
 0.504295 - 0.635366i  0.811174 
 0.605901 + 0.512404i  0.793519 
 0.605901 - 0.512404i  0.793519 
-0.785518 - 0.034684i  0.786283 
-0.785518 + 0.034684i  0.786283 
-0.409832 - 0.663633i  0.779981 
-0.409832 + 0.663633i  0.779981 
 0.299876 + 0.671995i  0.735869 
 0.299876 - 0.671995i  0.735869 
-0.003405 + 0.677926i  0.677934 
-0.003405 - 0.677926i  0.677934 
-0.523045 - 0.423832i  0.673209 
-0.523045 + 0.423832i  0.673209 
-0.545879  0.545879 
 0.200147  0.200147 
  
  
 VEC specification imposes 1 unit root(s). 
 
Based on these results we could consider that this model satisfactory describes the connection 
between implicated variables. Its use allow us to make an approximation of the impulse 
function form, which estimates the inflation evolution caused by a shock in the revenues level 
or in the public expenditures level:  
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4. DISCUSSIONS 
 
As the impulse functions from chart suggests, an initially exogenous shock in the dynamic of 
public revenues exercises initially a reduction in the inflation rate, followed in a 2-3 month by 
an „up” adjustment. After this period, the translated effects reach a lower „peak” in two 
quarters and are slowly absorbed after that. Similarly, an expansion of the public expenditures 
contributes to the inflationary tensions in a quarter. Such effect is slowly absorbed in 2-3 
quarters. 
It is important to remark that the ensemble of these effects is “short-termed”, reaching 
maximal levels in first two post-impact quarters. In other words, changes in the configuration 
of public decision mentioned determinants are fast and instable rebounded upon the dynamic 
of revenues and expenditures flows, determining frequent inter-correlated adjustment and 
exerting a “fast” reaction on the prices formation mechanisms. 
This framework could also be applied for the study of variances decomposition: 
 
     
     
 Period S.E. IP_SA VP_SA CHP_SA 
     
     
 1  57.80146  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  69.63696  87.05258  8.159565  4.787856 
 3  83.49744  61.56517  18.23186  20.20297 
 4  86.73714  58.64309  19.65323  21.70369 
 5  88.04111  56.92935  19.99214  23.07852 
 6  88.40181  56.88364  19.88359  23.23277 
 7  88.72249  56.95634  19.97716  23.06651 
 8  88.94663  56.69354  19.89588  23.41058 
 9  89.43421  56.14229  19.81185  24.04587 
 10  89.76193  56.34907  19.76064  23.89029 
 11  90.38239  55.57844  19.85897  24.56259 
 12  90.90093  54.98110  19.76256  25.25635 
     
     Cholesky Ordering: IP_SA VP_SA CHP_SA    
     
     
 
It could be noticed that the public revenues and expenditures contributes almost in the same 
proportion to the inflation rate volatility and the increases in these variables’ volatility are fast 
transmitted on inflationary behavior with induced effects being saturated in two quarters. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
  
The analysis presented in this paper had in mind to envisage the way of manifestation of the 
correlation between public resources, their allocation and the prices evolution. 
Results obtained suggest the existence of some “fast” adjustment processes inducted by the 
intrinsic characteristics of the fiscal policy, by the specific behaviour of the public authorities, 
particularities that are active in adoption and application of the public decision and also by the 
imperfect correlation between the fiscal and monetary policies. In other words, the impact of 
the fiscal policy on the costs levels, the modalities chosen by the public authorities to finance 
the public deficit as well as the inflationary expectations induced to the economic subjects 
could “counter-balance” the effects of a restrictive monetary policy. 
 
The main analytical development directions are: 
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• Widening of conceptual framework taken into consideration explicitly determinant 
factors of correlation between public revenues and public expenditures; 
• Adoption of some alternative methodologies for empirical testing of these 
determinants way of manifestation; 
• Taking into consideration the case of other emerging economic systems. 
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